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In this chapter, we follow Edward Craig’s (1990) advice: ask what the concept of
knowledge does for us and use our ﬁndings as clues about its application conditions.
What a concept does for us is a matter of what we can do with it, and what we do with
concepts is deploy them in thought and language. So, we will examine the purposes
we have in attributing knowledge. This chapter examines two such purposes, agent-
evaluation and informant-suggestion, and brings the results to bear on an important
debate about the application conditions of the concept of knowledge—the debate
between contextualists and their rivals.
}1. First Purpose: Agent-evaluation
It is a familiar feature of daily life that we criticize and defend actions by attributing
knowledge. Examples are easy to come by. The tub has a drip. Your spouse is
applying great force to the cold-water handle. You ﬁnally say, “You know that’s
not going to work! Let’s just call the plumber.”Here you criticize your spouse’s action
by attributing a piece of knowledge. Or, to use an example of Jason Stanley’s (2005:
10), suppose you and a friend are driving to a restaurant in a city you’re visiting.
At an intersection, you turn left toward a residential neighborhood instead of right
toward a row of restaurants. Your friend looks at you skeptically. You say, “It’s
OK. I know this is the way to the restaurant.” Here you defend your action by self-
attributing knowledge.
Nor do we cease to attribute knowledge for these evaluative purposes when the
stakes are high. On Friday (a few decades ago), when you see that the lines are long at
Keith DeRose’s bank, and you reallymust have that check deposited by Monday, you
can defend your choice not to wait in the long lines by saying, “It’s OK; I know it’s
open Saturday, I’ll come back then.” It might be harder to get away with a knowledge-
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attribution in such practical environments, but the attribution can still be used to
defend one’s action. And to criticize as well. If Keith keeps checking and checking, at
some point we will criticize him, “OK, Keith; now you know! You don’t need to check
anymore.”
These examples given so far are ﬁrst- and second-person present tense. But we can
and do evaluate actions by using third-person and past-tense knowledge-attributions.
OnMonday, after the check has cleared, onemight defend Keith’s waiting to deposit it
on Saturday by saying, “He was ﬁne to wait; he knew it was open the next day.” Keith
might do so himself as well.1 In speaking to his brother, my son might criticize me for
continuing to apply force to the cold-water handle by saying, “Dad knows this isn’t
going to work” and he certainly can criticize me after it breaks—by saying, “Dad knew
it wouldn’t work! He shouldn’t have kept trying!”
In each of these examples, knowledge is being attributed to an agent as a basis for
an evaluative judgment about the agent’sΦ-ing. The judgment may be a simple up or
down on Φ-ing, as it is in the examples given above—someone “should” or
“shouldn’t” Φ or have Φ-ed—but it also might be more nuanced—there’s a “reason-
ably good case” for the person to Φ or not to Φ. So, you might say, “Well, she knows
the train costs twice what the bus does, so that is a factor in favor of the bus.”We will
focus on up or down judgments.
Knowledge-attributions can thus be used as bases for assessments of agents’
actions. Of course, as Jessica Brown (2008b: 1139–40) remarks, for any sort of
consideration, there will be some occasion on which it can be mentioned to evaluate
action. To use one of her examples, you can mention the fact that a friend plans to
run a marathon to criticize the cook’s not giving her a larger portion of the soup or to
defend my giving her a larger portion.
It’s true that when ﬁrst- or second-person present-tense knowledge-attributions
are used for agent-evaluation one could often accomplish the same purpose by
simply asserting the proposition said to be known—for example, “She is running a
marathon later today; you should give her a bigger share of the soup!” (Arguably, this
has much to do with the relations between assertion and knowledge.) But when one is
speaking about someone not present in the conversation or speaking about an action
in the past, very often the simple “P” will not be effective for evaluative purposes,
because much will depend on the agent’s epistemic or psychological state regarding
P. Suppose we arrange that you’ll pick me up from the airport at 8pm. If I arrive two
hours early at 6pm I can hardly mount a serious criticism of you for not being there
when I deplane. I could try to scold you, saying “I was there at 6pm and had to wait
1 All these examples involve attributions rather than denials of knowledge. It’s true that sometimes we
do defend and criticize action by denying knowledge, and that we often defend and criticize belief this way.
If we want to go to a certain neighborhood X in a city, we might say, “We can’t just get on this bus; we don’t
know it goes to X.” And certainly we sometimes say, in response to others’ professed beliefs, “you don’t
know that.” The matter merits attention, but we will consider only attributions of knowledge here.
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two hours!” but it is all too easy for you to undermine it by appealing to your lack of
awareness: “I had no idea; you didn’t call or text me.” Compare the criticism, “You
knew I was arriving early! And yet you didn’t pick me up.” Agent-evaluation in such
cases won’t stick, unless it is based on an attribution of some cognitive or epistemic
relation between the agent and P.
How does this agent-evaluative purpose bear on the contextualism debate?
Couldn’t all sides happily agree that the concept of knowledge is useful for
agent-evaluation in these ways? The bearing on the contextualism debate
becomes apparent when we look at ways of responding to knowledge-attributing
agent-evaluations.
Consider a bank case, which could be high- or low-stakes. Keith decides to wait to
deposit the check Saturday, rather than standing in the long lines to deposit it Friday.
Suppose, in defense of Keith’s waiting, I point to Keith’s having good reason to think
it’s open Saturday. I have in effect given a little argument:
Keith has good reason to think the bank is open Saturday, so he can just wait to deposit it then.
Suppose you reject the conclusion, and suppose in particular you reject it because you
think some evaluative/normative contrary of it is true. So, suppose you claim Keith
can’t wait till Saturday; he must stand in line Friday.2 How might you object to my
argument? You could reject its premise, of course. Alternatively, you could claim
that, although the premise is true, still, the conclusion is false. That is, you could give
a response of the form:
“Yes, Keith has good reason to think the bank is open Saturday, but he shouldn’t wait till then
to deposit the check.”
Let us investigate this response further. On what basis might one make this response?
We will discuss two.
One is on the grounds of what we’ll call deliberative weight. So, for instance, you
might concede that Keith has good reason to think the bank is open Saturday but
insist he can’t just wait till then because, for instance, his relatives will be visiting
then and it would be too much of an inconvenience to drive to the bank then, or
perhaps because the lines are often even longer on Saturday than on Friday. You
might also mention epistemic considerations concerning the relation between the
bank’s being open Saturday and Keith’s depositing it Saturday, for example, by
saying “Keith doesn’t realize the bank accept deposits on Saturdays.” In offering
any of these responses, you are in effect suggesting that the issue of whether the
bank is open Saturday isn’t or shouldn’t be the decisive issue for Keith in his
decision-making. In effect, you’re suggesting that even if you “give” Keith the bank
2 Here “can’t” expresses impermissibility rather than inability. As Chase Wrenn points out in personal
communication, grammarians tend to discourage this usage.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/6/2015, SPi
140 MATTHEW MCGRATH
will be open Saturday as a premise to work with, this wouldn’t settle the question
for him of what to do.3
Another basis on which you might accept the premise but deny the conclusion of
the above argument concerns the agent’s epistemic relations to the target propos-
ition. You might claim that although Keith has good reason to think the bank will be
open Saturday he shouldn’t wait till then because he needs better reason/evidence/
grounds to think it’s open Saturday if he is to wait to deposit the check then rather
than standing in line on Friday. You might say, “Yes, Keith has good reason to think
it is open Saturday; but he shouldn’t wait till then because he doesn’t have good
enough reason to think it’s open Saturday.” Let’s call this way of responding to my
little argument the epistemic objection.
Side note. The epistemic objection needn’t be raised using the notions of evidence,
grounds, and so forth. Epistemologists often use a generalized notion of “epistemic
position” to cover a range of factors which all bear on knowledge, including externa-
listic factors such as how reliable one’s p-relevant belief-producing processes are as
well as how safe one’s indications of p are.4 One way to raise the epistemic objection
against the above defense of Keith’s waiting to deposit the check Saturday is to
concede that Keith has good reason to think the bank will be open then but to claim
that he shouldn’t wait till then because his epistemic position with respect to the bank
is open Saturday isn’t strong enough. Having said this, we will mainly focus on factors
such as evidence, reasons, grounds.
In general, where “V” is a cognitive or epistemic verb phrase, and “Φ-ing” picks
out an action or omission which would count as acting on P,5 let’s say that to raise the
epistemic objection to the argument:
S Vs that P, so S can Φ
is to concede that S Vs that P but claim that S can’t—or ought not/mustn’t/
shouldn’t—Φ because S doesn’t have a strong enough epistemic position with respect
to P. Epistemic objections to other V-based evaluations such as the below are
understood accordingly:
S Vs that P, so S must Φ
S Vs that P, so S mustn’t Φ
S Vs that P, so S need not Φ
as well as past-tense versions of these.
In raising the epistemic objection in this way, one is conceding that the subject has
the relevant cognitive or epistemic status—the subject Vs that P—but questioning
3 Whether a particular “deliberative weight” objection succeeds will depend on the sort of evaluation at
issue, whether it is an evaluation of the agent’s reasonableness or of something more objective.
4 See DeRose (2009: 7) and Fantl and McGrath (2009: 27–8).
5 In Φ-ing, one is acting on P, then, just if in Φ-ing one is using P as a reason to Φ.
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whether the subject is positioned epistemically well enough with respect to P in order
to act on P reasonably. One is questioning this because Φ-ing in the circumstances
counts as acting on P.
It should come as no surprise that it is harder to make the epistemic objection
against a knowledge-based evaluation of an action that it is against evaluations based
on attributions of having some reason or belief. This is because knowledge, presum-
ably, is logically stronger than these.6 What is a surprise—or is at least noteworthy for
epistemology—is that it is harder to make the epistemic objection than one would
expect it would be if the orthodox moderate invariantist view of knowledge-attribu-
tions were true.
Moderate invariantism is invariantism about knowledge-attributions7 conjoined
with the thesis that knowledge is, as Rysiew (2007, 632) puts it, ho-hum knowing: it
consists of something like justiﬁed true belief + something to cope with the Gettier
problem, where for a belief to be justiﬁed is for it to meet moderate epistemic
standards, not necessarily demanding ones (the standards could be construed inter-
nalistically or externalistically). In high-stakes cases in which much turns on an
agent’s action, an agent might well ho-hum know that P even though there is too
much of a risk that P is false for the agent to act on P. So, for instance, in the high-
stakes bank case, Keith would ho-hum know that the bank is open Saturday even
though there’s too much of a risk that it isn’t open Saturday for him to plan on
coming back then. So, if knowledge = ho-hum knowing, one would expect know-
ledge-attributing agent-evaluations in cases like the high-stakes bank case would be
vulnerable to the epistemic objection. And if they were vulnerable, we would expect
ordinary folk to seize on this vulnerability. So we would expect to ﬁnd, at least when
high-stakes subjects are under discussion, that the epistemic objection to such
knowledge-attributing agent-evaluations is (i) familiar and (i) putting skepticism
aside, sometimes unproblematically correct. All that is meant by “unproblematically
correct” is that the statements making up the objection—the concession of know-
ledge and the evidence-based agent-evaluation—are true and unproblematically so
(i.e., they are clearly, plainly true).
However, consider the epistemic objection in the case of knowledge:
Right, Keith knows the bank is open Saturday, but he needs more evidence that it is open
Saturday if he is to wait to deposit the check then.
It is not a familiar part of our epistemic lives to ﬁnd people saying such things even in
high-stakes cases (contrast the epistemic objection with knowledge with one con-
cerning good reasons to think it is open). Nor is it unproblematic, skepticism aside,
6 Thanks to a referee for Oxford University Press for emphasizing this in comments on an earlier draft.
7 Here we follow DeRose (2009: 2) in understanding invariantism as holding that knowledge-attributions
do not vary in their truth-conditions across contexts of attribution. With DeRose, we will also assume that
variation in truth-conditions sufﬁces for variation in content. This could be challenged, but let us put aside
those matters here.
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that the objection is correct in such a case. However, presumably this is exactly the
sort of case in which the objection would be unproblematically correct if it ever is.
This is not to say that the objection isn’t correct, only that it isn’t unproblematic that
it is. The objection, “I agree, he knows that P, but still he needs more evidence to act
on P” isn’t unproblematically true.8 If knowledge = ho-hum knowing, one would
expect that it would be unproblematically true in this sort of case if ever unprob-
lematically true.
One might object: maybe factivity is the key. Maybe the epistemic objection simply
can’t unproblematically be made in response to agent-evaluations appealing to
factive epistemic states. Knowledge, of course, is a factive attitude.9 However, it is a
familiar part of epistemic lives that ordinary speakers raise the epistemic objection
against factive epistemic states, especially in third-person or past-tense cases. If you
and I are discussing Keith and the bank, and I say that Keith held a correct belief
about the bank’s being open Saturday, you could easily raise the epistemic objection:
“Yes, his belief was correct, but he didn’t know it was—he needed better evidence
before planning on coming back Saturday.” We often say this sort of thing. We often
criticize people for acting on beliefs that are true but not well justiﬁed. Suppose
I don’t look for trafﬁc when I approach a wide and typically busy street. Assuming no
car is coming, I let my children walk across the wide street by themselves. Suppose no
car passes by. My belief was true. Even still, my wife can and will make the
unproblematically correct epistemic objection: “Sure, you turned out to be right
there was no trafﬁc in this case, but you didn’t know that; there could have been;
you shouldn’t have let them cross without much better evidence.” It is not hard to
imagine my wife objecting in a similar vein while conceding—in effect—that I had
ho-hum knowledge. Suppose I say, “I looked once, and no car was coming; and in
any case, the road was blocked off to trafﬁc; so I was ﬁne to let the kids cross!” My
wife could reply, “Sure, you turned out to be right that no car was coming, and there
was no actual risk because the road was blocked off; but there could have been a car
coming for all you knew; you shouldn’t have let the children cross without looking
twice.” This would be unproblematically correct. Contrast this with “Yes, you knew
no car was coming, but you shouldn’t have let the children cross without looking
twice.” Some will insist the last is correct. Again, the claim is only that it is not
unproblematically correct. Nor is a familiar part of our epistemic lives (in contrast to
my wife’s raising the epistemic objection for ho-hum knowing).
Next, a second and related surprise, if moderate invariantism is true: even in
practical situations in which one must meet very strong epistemic standards with
respect to P if one is to act (permissibly) on P, speakers appeal to knowledge to
dismiss epistemically based worries about their acting on P. If epistemic worries are
8 In what I believe is the ﬁrst piece of experimental philosophy to compare knowledge-attribution with
attributions of actionability (Buckwalter and Turri, manuscript), a very strong correlation was found.
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this concern.
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in the air about whether it’s too risky to plan to come back Saturday to deposit, Keith
might well say he knows that it’s open Saturday precisely to dismiss these worries.
But suppose knowledge = ho-hum knowing. Ho-hum knowing is perfectly compat-
ible with not meeting the requisite very strong epistemic standards. Why should
saying that one meets pretty good or better epistemic standards for P be a preferred
way of dismissing epistemic worries about acting on P in situations in which it’s clear
that one must meet very strong epistemic standards for P if one is to act on
P reasonably?
These two facts about knowledge-attributing evaluations of action pose a challenge
to the moderate invariantist orthodoxy: (1) assuming the truth of moderate invariant-
ism, we would expect the epistemic objection to be familiar in high-stakes cases and in
some such cases unproblematically correct in response to knowledge-attributing
agent-evaluations; this expectation is unfulﬁlled; and (2) assuming the truth of
moderate invariantism, we wouldn’t expect to ﬁnd knowledge-attribution being
widely used as a tool for dismissing epistemic worries about acting on P even when
discussing high-stakes cases in which the subject needs to meet very strong epistemic
standards with respect to P in order, reasonably, to act on P; yet, we ﬁnd just this.
There are responses on behalf of moderate invariantism, and we will consider
them later in the chapter. This section has given us a workable account of what the
agent-evaluative purpose of knowledge-attributions is and of features of that purpose
that are initially perplexing if moderate invariantism is true. We next turn to the
second purpose, informant-suggestion.
}2. Second Purpose: Suggesting Informants
Craig proposes that the point of the concept of knowledge is to ﬂag good informants.
The plan of his book is to “creep up” on the concept of knowledge by examining a
subjectivized version of the concept of a good informant—the concept of a good
informant for me here now—and then considering the results of the objectivization
of such a concept (1990, 83–4). However, not much attention in the book is paid to the
examination of the actual use of knowledge-attributions as a basis for suggesting or
suggesting informants. The focus here will be on this use, with which we are all
familiar. We will be concerned particularly with the way we use knowledge-attributions
to suggest informants to or for particular recipients or groups of recipients.
To suggest someone as an informant to a recipient is to suggest that the recipient
treat that person as an informant. There are a number of ways to do this. I might treat
you as an informant for me on whether P even if I know that you are undecided on
the matter yourself but have evidence bearing on the question that I don’t. (You saw
next week’s weather forecast and I didn’t.) I might treat you as a good informant,
again, if I know you would make a more educated guess on whether P than I would.
(You know the company better than I and can make a better guess of whether its
stock value will rise.) In this section, we will consider a stronger way in which one
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may treat someone as an informant. It is expressed in ordinary talk of “taking it”
from persons. To take it from a person whether P is to treat her word on whether P as
settling for oneself the question of whether P. I take it from the coffee store proprietor
that the shop is closed Sunday. I take it from an acquaintance in a casual conversation
that she just got back from London. I do not take it from the person offering a tip on a
stock that the stock will rise in value; at best I take it from her that there’s reason to
think it might; or maybe that it’s more likely than not. Nor do I take from the weather
forecaster that it will rain a week from today. In those cases, I do not take the relevant
issue—whether P—to be settled, either in favor of P or in favor of ~P, by the
informant’s word.
To illustrate the informant-suggesting purpose to be discussed, consider once
again a high-stakes bank case. Suppose, in such a case, you feel you can’t simply
wait till Saturday to deposit the check. Enter Sally. If I say to you, “Oh, good, here’s
Sally. She knows whether it’s open Saturday,” I can thereby suggest Sally to you as an
informant on the question of whether it’s open Saturday—I suggest you can take it
from her.
In saying “Sally knows whether it’s open” as a basis for suggesting you can take it
from her whether it’s open, I’m making a little argument, “Sally knows, so you can
take it from her.” If you deny my conclusion (“No, substitute: I can’t take it from
her”), you can respond to my argument in a number of ways. You could deny the
premise that Sally knows whether it is open; or you could claim that even if she
knows, she is a liar, or won’t tell, and so on, and so you can’t take it from her
(deliberative weight, again). Alternatively, you could raise the epistemic objection: you
could concede that the informant “knows whether P” but insist that her grounds/
reasons aren’t good enough for you to take it from her.
Now, assuming moderate invariantism is true, we would expect the epistemic
objection to be familiar and sometimes unproblematically correct when the relevant
stakes are high. We also wouldn’t expect, at least when the relevant stakes are high, to
ﬁnd speakers appealing to knowledge that P in their informant suggestions precisely
to dismiss epistemic worries about taking it from the subject that P. These two
surprises, like those concerning agent-evaluation, pose a challenge for moderate
invariantism.
One might worry here, even more than with agent-evaluation, that factivity is
doing the work. If I say, “Sally has the right answer whether P; you can take it from
her,” it would be very odd if you replied by giving the epistemic objection. If the
recipient agrees that Sally bears a factive cognitive relation to the question whether P,
then the recipient must think that by believing what Sally believes on the matter the
recipient would be believing truly on the matter. But this looks like a decisive reason
to believe P if the informant says P and believe ~P if she says ~P, and so to take it
from the informant whether P.
But factivity does no such work in informant-suggestions for recipients not part of
the conversation. Suppose you and I are watching a riveting ﬁlm called The Bank
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Cases. In the ﬁlm, the protagonist, Keith, needs an informant about whether the bank
is open on Saturday. Suppose, also, that Keith needs quite good grounds before taking
it as settled either way whether the bank is open Saturday. His stakes are high, and
there is a back-up “safe” option for him—just coming back Saturday to deposit the
check. Suppose I say about Sally, another character in the ﬁlm, “Sally knows whether
it’s open Saturday, so Keith can take it from her.” Now, if we replaced “know” with
the equivalent of ho-hum knowing-whether; that is, “has a correct answer” or “has a
reasonable correct answer”—and add something about the lack of Gettier-like
objective risk—would it be at all unusual for my claim to be met with the epistemic
objection? I don’t think so. “Sure, Sally has the right answer about the bank’s
Saturday hours—she’s relying on its past Saturday hours, and it turns out, as is
usual, it hasn’t changed those hours; but Keith’s whole future is at stake; he needs
better evidence than Sally’s assurance can provide if he is to wait till Saturday to
deposit the check.” The same goes for ho-hum knowing. However, raised against a
knowledge-attributing informant-suggestion, the epistemic objection is unfamiliar.
And it is hard to ﬁnd cases in which it is unproblematically correct.
}3. Implications for the Contextualism Debate
We have discussed two purposes of the concept of knowledge: agent-evaluation and
informant-suggestion. We have seen that the way the concept of knowledge serves
these purposes is surprising on the assumption of moderate invariantism. If know-
ledge were ho-hum knowing, we would expect the epistemic objection to be familiar
and unproblematically correct in at least some high-stakes cases; and we wouldn’t
expect that appealing to a subject’s knowledge that P in a high-stakes case would be
such an effective way of dismissing epistemic worries about the subject’s acting on
P. Moderate invariantism, then, faces a challenge. Proponents of alternative theories,
including varieties of “shifty” theories such as contextualism and subject-sensitive
invariantism, see openings.
The main sides in the contextualism dispute are these:10
Skeptical invariantism—skeptical-standards invariantism.
Moderate invariantism—moderate-standards invariantism. Knowledge = ho-hum
knowing.
Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI)—takes the invariant conditions on knowledge-
attributions to include a strong within-subjects connection between knowledge and
action: if you know P, P is actionable for you—that is, you have sufﬁcient evidence/
grounds to act on P reasonably. SSI is a form of fallibilism, and so allows knowledge
to coexist with an epistemic deﬁciency that could make a difference to actionability in
10 Noticeably missing is assessment relativism. See footnote 19 below for an argument that the claims
made about contextualism apply to relativism as well.
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some possible practical environments. Thus, SSI holds that which standard one
must meet to know P varies with one’s practical situation (the stakes, the available
actions, etc).
(Mainstream) contextualism—afﬁrms three claims:
(i) the standards that comprise the truth-conditions for knowledge-attributions
vary across contexts of attribution;
(ii) “internalism” about standard-determination; that is, what determines the
operative standard in any context is simply what beliefs, presuppositions,
and assumptions the speaker or conversational parties have;
(iii) in any context of attribution there is a single standard that comprises the
truth-conditions for any knowledge-attribution.
A few clariﬁcations on contextualism. First, standards here are understood as intel-
lectualist in Stanley’s (2005, 6) sense. That is, standards do not discriminate between
subjects with the same strength of epistemic position with respect to a given
proposition: they either both or neither satisfy the same standard. Thus, the sorts
of conditions the SSIers take to be conditions of knowledge (e.g., P’s being actionable
for the subject) do not count as standards, because they sometimes vary across
subjects with the same strength of epistemic position for the target proposition.
Second, internalism about standard-determination, afﬁrmed in (ii), claims that
speakers “call the shots” when it comes to which standards they are ascribing to
subjects. How things stand with the subject, if the subject is not the speaker, is
irrelevant to which standards comprise the truth-conditions of knowledge-attribu-
tions concerning him. Finally, (iii) has the welcome effect of guaranteeing the
invariant truth of intellectualism about knowledge: “no difference in knowledge
without a difference in strength of epistemic position.”11 Mainstream contextualism
is standards-based, internalist, and intellectualist.
In adjudicating the sides in this dispute, we will be concerned with questions of
explanation: assuming such-and-such side is correct, would there be a good explan-
ation of the way in which knowledge-attributions serve the purposes of agent-
evaluation and informant-suggestion, in particular for the unfamiliarity and absence
of unproblematically correct instances of the epistemic objection as well as the use of
knowledge-attribution, even in high-stakes cases, to dismiss epistemic worries about
whether the agent can reasonably act on the proposition in question or whether the
recipient can reasonably take it from the informant? Often I’ll formulate these
questions as questions about explaining the two purposes themselves, but this is
just shorthand for explaining the relevant data just mentioned.
11 This is a sloppy formulation, since it ignores the belief condition on knowledge. A better formulation
is this: if S1 and S2 have the same strength of epistemic position with respect to P, then either both or
neither is positioned to know P.
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Skeptical Invariantism
If knowing requires meeting the skeptical standards, then an agent’s knowing
P would entail that the subject’s epistemic position is strong enough for the subject
to act on P. Thus, it wouldn’t be at all surprising, if skeptical invariantism is true, that
the epistemic objection is unfamiliar and never unproblematically correct in response
to knowledge-attributing agent-evaluations. The same goes for knowledge-attributing
informant-suggestions. If the subject does indeedmeet skeptically high standards for P,
then the subject’s epistemic position is good enough for the recipient’s purposes,
regardless of the recipient’s stakes. Skeptical invariantism does very nicely, then, in
explaining this data. It also does well in explaining why appealing to knowledge
in agent-evaluation and in informant-suggestion would be a way of dismissing
epistemic worries about the agent’s action or the recipient’s taking it from the
informant. Knowing entails meeting skeptically high standards, and so if these are
satisﬁed for P then there is no basis for epistemic worries about relying in action or
inquiry on P.
The only problem is that knowledge-attributions would seem to be mostly false.12
The little arguments “S knows the bank is open Saturday, so S can just come back
then” and “S knows whether the bank is open Saturday, and so you can take it from
S concerning the matter” would have false premises. They would thus not establish
their conclusions, even if their conclusions were true. It would be like suggesting
someone as a basketball center on the basis of the claim “he’s 7 feet tall,” when in fact
he’s only 6 ½ feet tall.
One might claim that even though knowledge-attributions are almost always
literally false, they are regularly close enough to being true. Granted, the argument,
“S knows the bank is open Saturday, so S can just come back then” fails to establish its
conclusion because its premise is false. Still, the speakermanages tomean or impart an
argument that does establish its conclusion, one having the form “S meets condition
C with respect to the bank being open Saturday, so S can just come back then.”
C might be an anti-intellectualist condition (as per SSI) or it could be an epistemic
standard selected in such a way as to guarantee that the argument’s conclusion is true
if its premise is. The principal task of the skeptical invariantist is to explain how the
“right” argument gets imparted when the semantics give us the “wrong” argument,
and to explain this by appealing to general conversational principles rather than
specialized principles about “knows.” This is not an easy task to pull off.13
12 It might be replied that even if this is so, a vast number of our beliefs that we don’t bother to claim to
know are actionable in any practical environment and so wouldn’t be disqualiﬁed from being knowledge
on this basis. Think about Obama didn’t live in the seventh century, I’m not married to Aristotle, etc. Still,
knowledge is scarcer than one would have thought. See Davis (2007, 424) for an explicit endorsement of the
claim that knowledge in general sufﬁces for actionability in any practical environment.
13 See Davis (2007) for a sustained attempt to carry out this task, although Davis would not call his
account a skeptical one.
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Moderate Invariantism
What can the moderate invariantist say in response to the challenge we have raised?
One option is to give an error theory: we are simply wrong about knowledge. We will
put this possibility aside, provisionally, for the same reason DeRose (2005, 173) does:
we should presume that in cases in which speakers do not rely on some “mistaken
belief about an underlying matter of fact” that claims they make with “perfect
propriety” are true. A more appealing option is to dispute the claims about what
we would expect if moderate invariantism is true. In the ﬁrst part of this chapter—the
claim would be—we were ignoring the pragmatics of knowledge-attribution. Once we
get straight on the pragmatics, we can indeed explain the relevant data.
A good pragmatic account should appeal to relatively general features of conver-
sational pragmatics, together with the semantics, to explain the postulated pragmatic
phenomena. The best moderate invariantist account available is due to Brown (2006)
and Rysiew (2007), who base their accounts on the maxim of relation (“be relevant”).
The claim is that knowledge-attributions, when made in certain sorts of cases
(precisely the ones at issue), pragmatically impart or “implicate” propositions
about the knower having sufﬁcient grounds for P. The account is roughly as follows
(here we focus on agent-evaluation). Suppose the issue in a given conversation is
whether an agent meets a very high standard, for example, high enough for the agent
to act on P reasonably in a high-stakes case. Suppose, as per moderate invariantism,
that knowledge is ho-hum knowing. Why would saying that the agent knows that
P implicate that the agent meets the high standards? The idea is this: if you say that
the agent knows you are saying that the agent meets at least good standards, and your
interlocutors, to make sense of your utterance, need to see your statement as relevant;
they can do so by (and only by) taking you to think that the agent does indeed
meet high standards. In effect, the moderate invariantist appeals to a relevance-
implicature.
The problem with this account, if used to explain the data, is that the knowledge-
attribution could well be relevant in the suggested way and yet also susceptible to the
epistemic objection. Consider the defense “Keith has good reason to think that the
bank is open Saturday, and so he’s ﬁne to come back then.” In order to be relevant,
this “good-reason”-attribution must communicate that the reason is very good, good
enough for actionability. But this doesn’t protect against the epistemic objection. It is
perfectly familiar and often unproblematically correct to say, “Yes, he has good
reason, but not good enough; he needs to wait in line today.” So, we can agree with
Rysiew when he writes:
The more general point here is this: given the presumption of relevance, and given that
attributing knowledge involves ascribing an epistemic entitlement, in attributing know-
ledge to S the speaker takes on commitments as to S’s epistemic position (the status of S’s
beliefs) that go beyond what the ho-hum conditions on knowing might themselves require.
(2007, 643)
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But we should also note that this same point holds for attributions of good reasons as
well, and yet the epistemic objection for such attributions is familiar and in many
cases unproblematically correct; not so for knowledge.
The relevance account would also fail to explain why speakers ﬁnd it so useful to
speak of knowing that P in their attempts to dismiss epistemic worries about acting
on P (or relying on the informant that P). In saying one knows that P, one would be
imparting that one has a good enough epistemic position for P. Imparting that one’s
epistemic position is good enough is, in general, a good way to address concerns that
it isn’t. But imparting this through an assertion that one’s position is “pretty good or
better” opens the door to interlocutors accepting what one asserts but denying what
one implicates. This is a familiar feature of implicatures. If I am trying to imply that
X’s philosophical abilities are good enough to make X hirable, and I say, “X is a good
philosopher,” you, seeing my aim, can say, “it’s true X is a good philosopher, but not
good enough.” It might not be a polite thing to say, but it is available. (It is available,
even if more impolite, when ‘good’ is stressed: X is a good philosopher.) If you want
to shut down a certain worry, a better tactic is to assert something that your
interlocutor can’t simply concede while denying what you want to impart. But if
moderate invariantism is true, asserting knowledge is asserting something that your
interlocutor can simply accept while reasonably denying that your epistemic position
is good enough for action (or for someone else to take it from you).14
SSI
SSI is of course tailor-made to give a simple explanation of the agent-evaluation
purpose of knowledge-attributions. It does this nicely. When I say that S knows P,
what I’m saying entails that P is actionable for S, and so it is no surprise that the
epistemic objection is unfamiliar, that there are no cases in which it unproblemat-
ically is well taken, and that speakers wanting to dismiss epistemic worries about
whether the subject can act on P should do so by saying the subject knows that P. All
looks ﬁne on the agent-evaluative purpose.15
14 See Dimmock and Huvenes (2014), Fantl and McGrath (2012a), and DeRose (2009, 117–27) for
further objections to the moderate invariantist relevance accounts and for general negative assessments of
the prospects of giving pragmatic accounts to handle the data about knowledge-attributions.
15 One might suggest that in some cases the epistemic objection isn’t unproblematically incorrect, but if
SSI were true, we would expect it would be. Couldn’t we revise some of Jessica Brown’s (2008a) cases (e.g.,
SURGEON or AFFAIR) to come up with what are at least not unproblematically incorrect epistemic
objections? If so, isn’t this just as much trouble for SSI as the absence of unproblematically correct
epistemic objections is for moderate invariantism?
My response is two-fold. First, something which I haven’t emphasized thus far: the epistemic objection
doesn’t merely seem to be a case in which the intuitive jury is out as to whether it is true; it seems intuitively
incorrect. Perhaps it isn’t incorrect. Perhaps there is a good argument that the epistemic objection is very
often correct. But this is not how it seems. Second, unlike moderate invariantism, SSI has a good account of
why knowledge-attribution would be such a useful means of dismissing worries concerning action based
on a risk that P is false.
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However, as DeRose has emphasized (2009, ch. 7), the going is not so smooth
when it comes to the purpose of informant-suggestion. Suppose the recipient (Keith)
is in a much higher-stakes situation than the informant (Sally). In order to act on
P reasonably, Keith needs very strong grounds for P, stronger than Sally needs for
her to act on P. Now, if what I’m claiming in saying “Sally knows whether P” is
something like Sally’s epistemic position is good enough for her to act on P reasonably,
then clearly my knowledge-attribution can be true even if Sally’s epistemic position
isn’t good enough for Keith to act on P reasonably. So, it seems the epistemic
objection ought to be easily made: “Yes, Sally knows, but Keith can’t take it from her.”
SSIers therefore need a story about why within-subjects knowledge/actionability
connections should lead us to talk and think as if across-subjects knowledge/action-
ability connections hold. SSIers might be tempted to turn to pragmatics. The natural
way to go is, again, to the appeal to the maxim of relation. But this is no more
promising for the SSIer than it was for the moderate invariantist; in fact, it is even less
promising. It just isn’t at all clear why the fact that the informant’s epistemic position
is good enough for her should be relevant to whether the informant’s epistemic
position is good enough for the recipient, given they can differ dramatically in their
practical environments. And even supposing this relevance could be explained, if
what one asserts is something that could be reasonably accepted without accepting
what is implicated, we would expect the epistemic objection to be familiar and often
unproblematically correct, which it isn’t.
For all these reasons, it seems the SSIer must turn to an error theory to explain the
informant-suggestion purpose.16
Contextualism
SSI takes the subject (her practical environment) to “call the shots” and so explains
the agent-evaluation purpose but struggles to explain the informant-suggestion
purpose. One might think that since mainstream contextualism takes the speaker
(what she ﬁnds salient, what practical environment she is thinking of) to call the
shots, it will explain the informant-suggestion purpose but struggle with the agent-
evaluation purpose. One might therefore fear a “big ugly tie” which might compel us
to postulate an ugly ambiguity in “knows.” But DeRose (2009, 240) assures us
contextualism comes out on top:
Fortunately, the big ugly tie is broken by the realization that, on contextualism, speakers’ own
conversational interests can lead them to apply to subjects the standards that are appropriate to
the practical situations faced by those subjects.
16 See Hawthorne (2004, 164) and Stanley (2005, 101–4) for error theories, and DeRose (2009, 234–8)
and Cohen (2004, 489–90) for doubts. For an account of the relevance of empirical psychology to
knowledge ascriptions, see Nagel (2010) and (2012).
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The leading idea is that when we take certain conversational interests—agent-
evaluation, in particular—we can select standards appropriate to the subjects’
practical situation.17
However, speakers can make mistakes about subjects’ practical situations. Sup-
pose my wife, Frances, unaware of the high stakes involved, evaluates my waiting in
line at the bank for an hour on Friday, “Come on, Matt, you knew you could
deposit it Saturday without a line; you wasted your time.” Suppose we are assessing
Frances’ criticism, and she is not a party to our conversation. If contextualism is
true, then let’s ask how we could reject her argument’s conclusion, which we must
do. We would argue as follows: what Frances said when she said Matt “knew” he
could deposit the check Saturday was true but due to the high stakes—much higher
than Frances realized—Matt needed more evidence if he was to wait to deposit the
check Saturday. This is a version of the epistemic objection. We’re accepting the
knowledge-attribution but rejecting the evaluation of the action on the grounds
that more evidence was needed. We have ascended a level, discussing not whether
Matt knew but whether Frances’ remark that Matt knew was true. However, the
same problems arise: if contextualism were true, we would expect such higher-level
versions of the epistemic objection to be familiar and sometimes (as in this case)
unproblematically correct, which they are not.
The contextualist can point out that her account does at least ensure the following:
if a speaker attributes knowledge that P as a basis for an evaluation of an agent’s
action, then if the speaker’s assumptions about the agent’s practical situation are
correct, then if the speaker’s knowledge-attribution is true, then P is actionable for the
agent. So, anyone who accepts that knowledge-attribution and accepts the speakers’
assumptions about the agent is committed to thinking that P was actionable for the
agent. This commitment lapses only when these assumptions are brought into doubt.
But does the commitment lapse even under these conditions? It seems not. It isn’t a
familiar feature of our epistemic lives to ﬁnd ordinary speakers conceding the truth of
claims like Frances’ claim while insisting more evidence was needed for Matt to act.
Nor do such combinations of claims seem unproblematically correct. Frances herself
will likely retract not merely her criticism of Matt but her knowledge-attribution
once she ﬁnds out the facts about Matt’s practical situation. But on the contextualist
view in question, this retraction would be the retraction of something that is perfectly
true. Such retractions ought, therefore, to be familiar and sometimes unproblemat-
ically correct.
Unless the mainstream contextualist appeals to an error theory, or adds a prag-
matic twist, it seems that she cannot explain all the data concerning the agent-
evaluation purpose.
17 See also Greco (2008) and Henderson (2009) for similar accounts.
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Similar points hold for the informant-suggestion purpose. Suppose I know Tom
needs an informant on whether P. But I’m wrong about his stakes. They’re much
higher than I think. I say, “Sally knows whether P. Tom can take it from her.” Here,
again, it seems the contextualist must say—at least assuming that my assumptions
about Tom’s stakes are determinative of the epistemic standard expressed by his use
of “knows”—that my knowledge-attribution was true but still Sally’s evidence/
grounds for P aren’t good enough for P to be actionable for Tom. So, it ought to
be familiar and unproblematically correct for me, after being apprised of Tom’s high
stakes, to say, “What I said when I said Sally ‘knows’ was true but she didn’t have
good enough evidence for Tom to rely on her.” However, again, this is neither
familiar nor unproblematically correct.
Here, we should note the shortcomings of the sort of contextualist view Fantl and
I have sympathetically explored (Fantl and McGrath, 2012b), namely internalist
subject-sensitive contextualism. This view makes the actionability of P for an agent
an invariant condition of attributions to the agent of knowledge that P, but allows the
truth-conditions of such knowledge-attributions to vary across contexts of attribu-
tion insofar as when certain practical situations are salient in a context of attribution
it takes more to be truly described in that context as “knowing.”18 Such a sensitive
contextualism gives a good account of the agent-evaluative purpose, but because it
relies on an internalist contextualist element it cannot do the same for the informant-
suggestion purpose.19
So far, I’ve only considered versions of mainstream contextualism, and in particu-
lar ones embracing internalism about standards-determination. On this sort of
contextualism, if the speaker assumes that a subject is in a low-stakes situation,
and the purpose of the conversation is agent evaluation, the standards would be low,
18 So, according to Fantl and McGrath (2012b), if P isn’t actionable for S, then any attribution of
knowledge that P to S is false; however, if P is actionable for S, there might be some contexts which an
attribution of knowledge that P to S is true and others in which an attribution of knowledge that P to S is
false.
19 Mainstream assessment relativism holds that knowledge-attributions vary in truth-value across
contexts of assessment. Consider a standards implementation of this view, together with internalism
about how the standards are determined. Call this mainstream assessment relativism. Can this view do
better on the two functions of knowledge-attribution?
Recall the case of Frances’ criticism of Matt waiting in line: “Matt knew the bank was open Saturday, so
he should have just come back then.” Suppose, again, that Frances has falsely assumed that the stakes were
relatively low. Now, if assessment relativism is true, then what Frances said is true relative to her context of
assessment. So, isn’t the following a way to raise the epistemic objection: “What Frances said in sayingMatt
knew is true in her context of assessment, but Matt had insufﬁcient evidence to do what he did”? We don’t
of course ordinarily discuss contexts of assessments per se, but we do ordinarily discuss something like
them. We say: “What Jack said when he said it is winter is true for him in Australia.” If mainstream
assessment relativism were true, then we would expect the likes of “What Frances said in saying Matt knew
is true for her [in her situation] but Matt needed more evidence to do what he did” to be familiar and in
some cases unproblematically correct. We ﬁnd neither.
Finally, just as one can move to externalist versions of contextualism, one can move to externalist
versions of assessment relativism, and I suspect, but will not explicitly argue, that the dialectic would be
quite similar.
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even if this assumption is false and the subject is in a high-stakes situation. But if we
give up internalism about standards-determination, we can avoid this consequence.
The guiding idea would be that the speaker manages to load into the truth-conditions
of her utterance the standards that are in fact appropriate to the agent’s practical
situation, not merely the standards that would be appropriate if the speaker’s assump-
tions about the agent’s practical situation were true. Thus, when Frances says, “Matt
knew that he could deposit the check Saturday; he wasted his time standing in line
Friday,” her knowledge-attribution is true only if Matt meets the high standards
appropriate to his situation, and not merely the low ones which Frances thinks (falsely
in this case) are appropriate to his situation. A similar move is possible for the
informant-suggesting purpose. When I’m wrong about your practical situation, and
it’s much more urgent than I think, then I’m in fact applying high standards in
asserting “Sally knows whether P,” even if I think I’m applying only low standards.
We can clarify all this by appealing to Kaplan’s (1978) dthat operator. Here we
understand “dthat,” in a familiar way, to function as follows: it is an operator that
takes a deﬁnite description and produces a term that directly refers to the thing that
satisﬁes the deﬁnite description if there is one. When Frances says “Matt knows that
P,” she manages to assert that Matt meets dthat (the standard that Matt must meet
for P to be actionable for Matt). The proposition Frances asserts has a particular
standard loaded into it—namely, the one Matt in fact must meet to have this
proposition as a reason. A similar account would apply in the case of informant-
suggestion.
This proposal, which I’ll call direct-reference contextualism, seems to give us
exactly what we want. When, in evaluating an agent, I assert, “S knew that P,”
what I say will be true only if P was actionable for S, and so if you accept it, you
commit yourself to thinking this. If we ordinary speakers have a sense of this, we can
see why the epistemic objection is neither familiar nor unproblematically correct (it
predicts that it is always incorrect). The same applies to informant-suggestion.
Suppose I suggest an informant for Keith by asserting, “Sally knows whether P.”
What I assert will be true only if Sally’s evidence/grounds for P (or not-P) are strong
enough, if transferred to Keith, to make that proposition actionable for Keith. Again,
this account seems to explain the unfamiliarity and absence of unproblematically
correct epistemic objections.
There is one hitch. Direct-reference contextualism abandons the raison d’eˆtre of
contextualism, or at least the main motivating factor behind most ﬂesh-and-blood
contextualists: the upholding of intellectualism (DeRose, 2009, 25). The fact that the
standards are determined externally and agent-by-agent will yield counterexamples
to intellectualism. Suppose I’m evaluating two subjects, Mary and John, at once.
I think, falsely, that they face the same sort of practical situation. I also think, falsely,
that Mary’s evidence is better than John’s. In fact, Mary and John have equally strong
evidence but Mary’s practical situation is a humdrum low-stakes one whereas,
unbeknownst to me, John’s is a high-stakes one. I might claim, “Mary knows that
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P, but John doesn’t know that P.”What I’m really claiming isMary meets X and John
doesn’t meet Y, where X and Y are determined by their actual practical situations.
Given the actual facts, Mary does meet X, since X is a low standard, but John doesn’t
meet Y, since Y is a very high standard. Thus, my claim “Mary knows that P but John
doesn’t know that P” comes out true. A further claim is also true in my context, even
if I think it isn’t; namely, “Mary and John have the same strength of epistemic
position with respect to P.” It follows that in my context a sentence asserting a
counterexample to intellectualism about knowledge is true.
Thus, the only view we have been able to ﬁnd, short of skeptical invariantism,
which provides a satisfying explanation of the two purposes of knowledge-attribu-
tion, and does so without an error theory—direct-reference contextualism—cannot
sustain intellectualism.20 Perhaps this is a price we should be willing to pay. However,
this is not the end of the story.
}4. Final Thoughts
In the previous section, direct-reference contextualism emerged as the leading
candidate for explaining the two purposes of knowledge-attributions we have been
concerned with. However, in this last section, I want to suggest that general epis-
temological considerations may well point us in a different direction.
Note a crucial feature of informant-suggestion purpose. There is no coherent non-
skeptical story to be told about how, in general, one party’s knowledge that P should
make P actionable for any other subject, however high her stakes. We should
therefore not accept a theory that builds such a condition on knowledge into the
invariant truth-conditions of knowledge-attributions. So far, no threat to direct-
reference contextualism. It does not try to build any such condition invariantly
into the truth-conditions of knowledge-attributions.
By contrast, there is an apparently coherent non-skeptical story to be told about
how, in general, a subject’s knowledge that P should make P actionable for that
subject.21 If this story is acceptable, this gives us a good reason to build into the
20 In comments on an earlier draft, John Greco suggested that the contextualist has another option. She
could say, as Greco suggests in his (2012), that the attributor context picks out one practical environment,
where a practical environment is deﬁned by a set of relevant practical tasks, attaching, perhaps, to several
actual and/or potential actors. Standards are determined by the practical environment so deﬁned. In my
case of Mary and John, since the purpose is agent-evaluation, some single practical environment that one of
them was in would serve to set the standards, and so we wouldn’t get the anti-intellectualist result.
However, I don’t see what mechanism would ensure that the “right” practical environment determines
the standards. In a case in which the speaker thinks the practical environments of Mary and John involve
only low stakes, and in which indeed Mary is in a low-stakes environment, why would the standards be
determined by the higher-stakes environment of the other subject?
21 The story Fantl and I favor, in brief, goes like this. Knowing that P sufﬁces to make P warranted
enough for the subject to be a reason she has for belief. What is warranted enough to be a reason a subject
has for belief is warranted enough to be a reason she has for action. Thus, knowing that P makes
P warranted enough for the subject to be a reason she has for action. But what is warranted enough to
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invariant conditions on knowledge-attributions the condition that what is “known”
is actionable for the knower.
And if we do build actionability into the invariant truth-conditions for knowledge-
attribution, direct-reference contextualism must be rejected, not merely moderate
invariantism and mainstream contextualism.22 The problem is as follows. Suppose
a subject S is in a high-stakes situation, but neither P nor not-P is actionable for
her. A speaker says, “S knows whether P,” suggesting her as an informant to a low-
stakes recipient. Direct-reference contextualism requires that the knowledge-attribu-
tion comes out true (assuming S has a true belief whether P, etc.). But then the
utterance “S knows whether P” is counted as true even though neither P nor not-P is
actionable for S. This violates the invariant truth of “If a subject knows that P, P is
actionable for her.”23
What the above reﬂections show us is that the Craigian attempt to get at know-
ledge through a study of the purposes of the concept of knowledge is in principle
constrained by general epistemological considerations. A good account of know-
ledge-attributions balances Craigian “practical explication” with traditional epis-
temological argument. The balancing act may require willingness, in some cases, to
postulate mistakes by ordinary competent uses of the concept about its application
conditions. Like DeRose, I accept a presumption against the postulation of such
mistakes. In some instances, though, general epistemological considerations can give
us a defeater for this presumption. If I am right that general epistemological argu-
ment can give us good reason to accept a within-subjects knowledge/actionability
connection, then this is one such instance.24
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